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The British Home Stores pension scheme:
privatised looting?
Ian Clark
ABSTRACT
On entering administration, British Home Stores owed its pension scheme £571 mil-
lion—a signiﬁcant employment relations issue of historical wage theft by investor–
owner managers. The article locates ‘lawful’ looting of business assets in a framework
that builds on Ackerlof and Romer’s theory of bankruptcy for proﬁt and connects this
to an empirical narrative on business re-structuring at British Home Stores towards
administration.
1 INTRODUCTION
In May 2000, the Arcadia group headed by Phillip Green bought British Home Stores
(BHS) for £200 million. After sustained re-structuring of the business in March 2015,
Green sold BHS to Retail Acquisitions for £1. At this date, BHS was carrying a pen-
sion fund deﬁcit of £345 million. By April 2016, when BHS was wound up by Her
Majesty’s Customs and Revenues, the pension fund deﬁcit had grown to £571 million,
that is, BHS owed its pension funds £571 million. A parliamentary inquiry into the
collapse of BHS by the Department for Work and Pensions found that Green and
his investment partners hollowed out BHS to the value of £423 million in dividends
and charges paid to Arcadia and associated businesses. Similarly, the inquiry found
that during its 13-month ownership of BHS, Retail Acquisitions extracted £11 million
from the business in charges, dividends and salary payments for its leadership team.
Prominent observers of BHS under Phillip Green have described how the business
was ‘looted’ (Shah, 2018: 282).
In a BBC radio interview, Frank Field MP, who chaired the Department of Work
and Pensions inquiry, went further than Shah.
He is worse than Maxwell, he plundered BHS and must now pay out at least £571 million to fund the
pension hole. (BBC Radio 4 Today programme, 25 July 2016)
Field later concluded that it might be a coincidence that the numbers extracted from
BHS approximate to those of the BHS pension fund deﬁcit. Field’s statements and
observations raise two research questions; ﬁrst, in this case as in many others, the pen-
sion fund deﬁcit and associated corporate debt pile are not the result of an amorphous
‘pensions crisis’. Rather, they result from the demands of investor value, the
Friedman doctrine on the aims of the ﬁrm and in the contemporary period the
ﬁnancialisation of businesses. Therefore, how does ﬁrm level re-structuring come to
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enable the lawful diversion of employer contributions to ﬁnal salary pension funds to
other recipients? Second, fundamental defects in the regulation of incentive arrange-
ments for investor–owner managers enable them to raise debt and borrow against
pension fund contributions in order to pay dividends and fees. So why is this diversion
and the manner in which it unravelled at BHS an employment relations issue? Both
questions are timely and thrown into sharper focus for workers as policymakers,
and key stakeholders consider issues around implementation of the deﬁned beneﬁt
pension’s white paper (Department for Work and Pensions, 2018). The white paper
focusses on worker protections therein and makes proposals around the regulation
and the consolidation of pension schemes. More critically, the article comes as the
Department of Work and Pensions is consulting on proposals to expand The Pensions
Regulator’s powers. Speciﬁcally, reporting and anti-avoidance of employer liabilities
come under scrutiny with discussion on effective and persuasive imposition of civil
and criminal sanctions on those who oversee negligent schemes (The Pensions
Regulator, 2017, 2018). As part of this process in February 2019, the Work and
Pensions secretary unveiled jail terms of up to seven years for managers who oversee
wilful or reckless mismanagement of a ﬁrm-level pension scheme.
To address the two research questions, the article proceeds through four parts. Part
one makes a ﬁrst contribution to new knowledge and methodological innovation by
locating ‘lawful’ looting of business assets in a theoretical framework that builds on
Akerlof and Romer (1993), who outlined the idea of bankruptcy for proﬁt. This for-
mulation generates new knowledge by outlining how moral hazard provisions pro-
vided by the state insulate investor–owner managers of a business from the social
harm consequences of innovative uses of employer contributions to pension funds.
By further developing these theories and applying them to the winding-up and admin-
istration of BHS, it is possible to theorise how business owners have an incentive to
collapse a business into liquidation or administration. Part two outlines why the ap-
propriation of employer contributions to ﬁnal salary pension schemes is an employ-
ment relations issue. To connect the theoretical argument with empirical material,
part three grounds the theoretical framework in a narrative that details business re-
structuring at BHS towards administration under the ownership of Arcadia and
Retail Acquisitions. The narrative provides a further (empirical) contribution to
new knowledge by revealing how lawful uses of employer pension fund contributions
enable owner–investors to extract value from a business and the deferred incomes of
its workers. Lastly, part four provides a discussion of the two research questions and a
conclusion on the potential for the re-politicisation of pension fund contributions in
the wake of the collapse of BHS and other more recent pension fund collapses such
as that at Carillion. Before moving to part one, the remainder of the introduction
contextualises the BHS case during a period when ‘ﬁnancialisation’ dominated the
management of many businesses and associated approaches to proﬁt and surplus. A
brief deﬁnition of ﬁnal salary or deﬁned beneﬁt pension schemes and the status these
schemes have in the UK follows this discussion.
1.1 Financialisation
The term ﬁnancialisation refers to a pattern of accumulation where proﬁt making oc-
curs increasingly through ﬁnancial channels rather than through trade and commod-
ity (Krippner, 2005: 181). More recently, Thompson (2013: 475) has summarised the
literature on ﬁnancialisation as a growth or macroeconomic regime whose source of
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proﬁts is increasingly through ﬁnancial channels and ﬁnancial engineering rather than
production and product markets. Financialisation represents a process in which
‘economic activity in general has become subject to the logic and imperatives of
interest-bearing capital and corresponds to an increasing scope and prevalence of in-
terest bearing capital in the accumulation of capital’ (Fine, 2010: 99, 2014: 55).
Therein, ﬁnancialisation involves three processes. First, the ascendency of share-
holder value prioritises the interests of investors at the expense of other ﬁrm-level
stakeholders (van der Zwan, 2014). Second, the emphasis on shareholder value
legitimises a more aggressive management of corporate assets to prioritise ﬁnancial
objectives, for example, high stock prices and maximising the release of cash ﬂows
to investors, at the expense of other stakeholders (Thompson, 2011). Third, it popu-
larises a range of ﬁnancial techniques whereby investors extract the gains from corpo-
rate restructuring and divestment rather than reinvesting savings in the ﬁrm or
sharing the gains with other stakeholders.
Non-ﬁnancial businesses in general and manufacturing and service providers in
particular, for example, General Electric, General Motors, BHS and Carillion,
are increasingly freed from just producing goods or supplying services and began to
‘act more like ﬁnancial market players’ (Stockhammer, 2004: 720). Therein, proﬁts
derive from ownership, debt funding, divestment and downsizing of a business rather
than in investment in expanded production. Therefore, at ﬁrm level, a business may
become subordinate to ﬁnance by relying upon internal ﬁnancial dealings as a major
source of proﬁts (Fine, 2014). For example, the ﬁnancialisation of a ﬁrm, by debt
loaded onto it by its new owners or the extraction of value from its asset base by a
failure to maintain ﬁrm level ﬁnancial commitments, can make a ﬁrm a ﬁnancial asset
to its investor–owners often within a larger investment portfolio. Accordingly, incen-
tive structures within ﬁnancialised businesses align with those who own and manage
the portfolio and debt owners who are the portfolio investor-managers. For
investor–owner managers, the incompatibility between short-term value extraction
and longer term business viability is frequently not problematic. This is so because in-
vestor business models associated with ﬁnancialisation such as private equity and
hedge funds or investor strategies that mimic these models frequently use divestment
of a business to avoid longer term commitments. It is here that ﬁnal salary pension
schemes are problematic; they compete for capital with dividends, and the overall cost
of a ﬁnal salary scheme may be an impediment to the sale of a business in terms of
merger and acquisition liquidity.
1.2 Deﬁned beneﬁt and ﬁnal salary pension schemes
A deﬁned beneﬁt pension scheme relates a pension beneﬁt to a member’s salary in ad-
vance independent of investment returns secured by pension scheme investments. A
ﬁnal salary variant of deﬁned beneﬁt provides a pension based on the number of years
of pensionable service, an accrual rate and ﬁnal earnings as deﬁned by the scheme.
This is often the best three or the last three years of service. Due to the UK’s ageing
population, the prolonged period of low interest rates since the ﬁnancial crisis and the
associated low level of projected future earnings resulting from these developments
most deﬁned beneﬁt schemes are closed to new members. However, 14,000 employers
support these schemes and there are over 10 million members of such schemes with
£1.5 trillion of assets (Department of Work and Pensions, 2018: 4). Although there
are only a few schemes where owners make irresponsible decisions, the impact of
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these on a pension scheme is considerable, and in the light of the BHS case, the
pension regulator has recently speciﬁcally identiﬁed the current risks to ﬁnal salary
pension schemes. These risks include deliberately poor stewardship of a scheme, busi-
ness owners who decide to avoid their responsibilities and those who decide to obfus-
cate over the requests made by the regulator and or fail to comply with these requests
(The Pension Regulator, 2017, 2018).
2 A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR LAWFUL LOOTING
Under certain conditions, business owners may decide that they can secure a greater
level of proﬁt if they ‘loot’ a business to extract value in this way rather than seeking a
sustainable route to growth and prosperity. The presence of certain conditions
incentivise some investor–owner managers to pay themselves and associated busi-
nesses considerable rewards and if necessary default on debts and liabilities.
In a contribution that examines the savings and loans crisis in the 1980s, Akerlof
and Romer (1993) develop a theory of lawful looting. Their theory centres on the
presence of incentives that encourage investor–owners to go broke at society’s ex-
pense whilst maximising current extractable value out of a business. This part of
the article outlines Akerlof and Romer’s theory and then applies it to the demise of
BHS. By association, it is necessary to point out that Akerlof and Romer suggest that
the presence of government guarantee schemes are likely to enable the realisation of
their theory; in this case, the pension protection fund is the relevant guarantee
scheme. The pension protection fund is a government brokered private levy on all ﬁ-
nal salary pension funds what Akerlof and Romer (1993) term a protection against
social harm. Trustees of the pension protection fund transfer the deﬁcit and liabilities
of one pension scheme to all other solvent schemes, that is, other schemes meet these
debts, which effectively privatise them to individuals (rather than the state) in other
schemes. By further ﬂeshing out their model, it is possible to establish a link between
looting and moral hazard provisions. Application of this link to BHS will illustrate
how guarantee schemes such as the pension protection fund can act as an incentive
to loot in terms of moral hazard. However, an inappropriate use of funds that
theoretically allocated to ﬁrm-level pension scheme contributions derives from the in-
centive structures within the broader process of ﬁnancialisation; this connection cre-
ates the incentive for debt creation and the closure or collapse of such schemes. The
protections provided by the UK’s pension protection scheme may encourage some
business owners to act recklessly, but the incentive schemes and structures associated
with ﬁnancialisation operate independently to these protections.
The model of Akerlof and Romer (1993) contains three components. For each of
these, they provide empirical examples of looting. First, the presence of limited liabil-
ity. Limited liability protects all equity holders by limiting their exposure to the whole
debts of a business, but in some situations, for example, where there is a dominant
shareholder, it also provides these investor–owners with the potential to exploit cred-
itors and possibly loot the business. It is possible to fund looting through a rights issue
of shares that will dilute the ownership value of all individual shareholders. This is
particularly the case where the accrual of dividends to these shareholders is behind
those of debenture holders or owners of voting shares in a ﬁrm. The monies provided
by a rights issue frequently fund interim payments to management, dividend
recapitalisations or loans to associated businesses that extract value from the business
rather than using these monies for more sustainable business development.
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The exploitation of creditors can occur in numerous other ways, for example, the
value of a business can be boosted by an inﬂated net worth value created by the use
of artiﬁcial accounting entries which exaggerate the value of business goodwill. Not
only will this encourage creditors to feel conﬁdent about their investment in a business
but it also enables investor–owners to ‘ride’ the yield curve. For example, they can in-
vest in high yield assets such as property in high cost cities. In stable economic condi-
tions where asset prices are rising but inﬂation is low, many business liabilities such as
pension funds and deﬁcits and surpluses therein appear as low yield liabilities or assets
particularly if interest rates are low. In these circumstances inﬂated good will and ap-
parently high yield assets owned by a business boost creditor conﬁdence in the short
to medium term.
The second component of Akerlof and Romer’s theory focuses on the presence of a
signiﬁcant level of debt. Debt may become signiﬁcant due to a failure of a business
model or following changes in business methods in a particular sector. For example,
the way in which internet shopping has de-stabilised ‘bricks and morter’ retailing sig-
niﬁcantly affect the proﬁtability and sustainability of many high street retailers. In
these situations or even in cases where a business model is not ﬂawed, investor–
owners may choose to drive a solvent ﬁrm into administration if an investor–owner
knows they are unable to repay debts that have been loaded on a business. They
can do so by continuing to extract money from high yield assets and investments
and returning this money to investors rather than investing in the longer term sustain-
ability of a business. Frequently referred to as ‘taking money out of a business’ this
practice enables business owners to recapitalise, that is, add debt to, the balance sheet
of a business by using property assets as collateral on debt. In turn, the incurred debt
meets interim dividends to speciﬁc groups of investors or funds management bonuses.
Appelbaum et al. (2013) provide empirical support for this argument, detail four cases
where investor–owners acquired businesses and then extracted value from them to the
extent that in three of the four cases, the businesses entered administration. In one
case, they did so by selling property assets, for example, all the stores owned by a
business, and using that revenue to pay interim dividends to investors. The operating
businesses then leased back the stores adding a new cost to the business. The collapse
of Carillion, the British multinational construction and facilities management ﬁrm in
2018 provides further empirical support for the argument. The cross-departmental
parliamentary inquiry into Carillion’s collapse found that
Directors rewarded themselves and other shareholders by choosing to pay out more in dividends
than the company generated in cash despite increasing borrowing … and a growing pension deﬁcit.
[House of Commons (HC), 2018]
Carillion ﬁnanced its debt by borrowing against the value of its pension scheme.
Limited liability beneﬁts shareholders where a ﬁrm borrows £10 million to pay
£10 million in dividends—that is, take money out of the ﬁrm. However, the costs
of any administration or bankruptcy fall on lenders and pension fund members,
both those in receipt of pensions and those currently paying into any ﬁnal salary
scheme. The HC report also found that senior manager investor–owners at Carillion
acted purely in their own self-interest and in alignment with their personal incentives
to test the checks and balances on corporate conduct (HC, 2018: 86). To summarise,
interest payments that a ﬁrm makes to its creditors are allowable as a deduction
against earnings and liability to taxation but payments a ﬁrm makes to shareholders
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are not. This encourages investor–owner managers to take advantage of limited lia-
bility provisions and take a ﬁrm private, delisting its share capital. ‘Going private’
further encourages these owners to raise ﬁnance in the form of debt rather than
equity.
A third component in Akerlof and Romer’s theory of looting centres on the signif-
icant social harm that looting, administration and bankruptcy frequently creates. To
make this point, they use the comparative example of how looters do so in a riot caus-
ing total losses that are far greater than the private gains they may capture for them-
selves and their co-looters. This behaviour is particularly prevalent where the state via
its regulators provide explicit guarantees, for example, deposit insurance. Application
of this component of the model enables further illustration how the regulatory frame-
work of contemporary British capitalism allows investor–owners the opportunity to
use employer contributions to ﬁrm level pension funds in a ﬁnancially creative way.
Investor–owners are able to do so by taking a ﬁrm and its creditors, including its em-
ployee pension scheme, private and using monies earmarked for employer contribu-
tions to a pension fund in different ways. Limited liability enables businesses to
take on board signiﬁcant levels of debt, where in the contemporary period terms such
as dividend recapitalisations and interim dividend payments disguise debt. By associ-
ation, debt enables investor–owners to ride the yield curve using property assets as
collateral for debt re-capitalisations. However, ownership of property assets whilst
nominally in one business is often more complicated than it appears by the use of sale
and leaseback arrangements. In particular circumstances, the fusion of limited liabil-
ity, disguised debt levels and business models derived from the market for corporate
control can result in looting and the transfer of pension fund liabilities to the pension
protection fund.
What connects the three components of Akerlof and Romer’s theory is how the
potential for moral hazard provisions, derived from incentive structures associated
with the process of ﬁnancialisation in business level assets, enable some employers
to lawfully loot a business. In economic theory, moral hazard describes those situ-
ations where the behaviour of a ﬁrst party may change to the detriment of a sec-
ond because of a particular decision or transaction by the ﬁrst party. For example,
where once they have secured house contents insurance, homeowners become more
relaxed about security. Moral hazards also arise in employment relationships, for
example, when managers are unable to observe all actions taken by their em-
ployees where as a result shirking may be commonplace. More pertinently, for this
discussion, the Carillion case and that of BHS witness moral hazard at managerial
level because dispersed minority shareholders are unable to observe the actions of
smaller groups of or even individual investor–owner managers. That is, a tension
between what owners want; the best return for their money and what their agents
want and how both follow self-interested behaviour to secure this unfolds. The best
way to solve this problem is to incentivise managers to act like owners by paying
them in stock options but make them subject to the performance requirements of
the market for corporate control (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). However, as the
BHS case will demonstrate, a problem occurs where investor–owners are also man-
agers and have self-determined incentive structures that have the potential to re-
verse the principal-agent problem and create an investor–owner moral hazard.
Superﬁcially, this position appears to derive from protections enacted by the state
and its regulators; however, the incentive structures associated with ﬁnancialisation
make the moral hazard.
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3 EMPLOYER PENSION FUND CONTRIBUTIONS: AN EMPLOYMENT
RELATIONS ISSUE?
Whilst Akerlof and Romer (1993) describe their theory of looting at an abstracted
level, other contributions to the literature connect the three components they outline
to work and employment. At ﬁrm level, these include higher levels of job insecurity,
increased wage inequality and the dismantling of collective representation, see, for ex-
ample, Appelbaum and Batt (2014: 193). To ground these connections further, it is
necessary to make clear theoretical connections to employment relations. A ﬁrst con-
nection to employment relations and the broader political economy of labour ﬂows
from the ‘Friedman doctrine’. First espoused by Milton Friedman in 1962, the doc-
trine takes what is now termed a shareholder value approach to social responsibility
(Friedman, 1962, 1970). This approach views investors, shareholders and investor–
owners as economic engine rooms in the ﬁrm and the only stakeholders to whom
the ﬁrm must be socially responsible. From this, the goal of proﬁt maximisation is
to return a portion of these proﬁts to investors as a reward for the risk they took in
investing in the ﬁrm.
Now embedded for over 50 years, the principle that the sole purpose of the ﬁrm is
to produce proﬁt is a core feature of liberal market economies such as those in the
British and American business systems. The principle emerged in the American and
then increasingly in the British economy as market-oriented actors began to seize con-
trol of ﬁrms. This ﬁrst emerged in the form of mergers, then in the form of hostile
takeovers and management buyouts and then through the rise of investor–owner, ac-
quisitions backed by investor activism in hedge funds and private equity funds
(Greenspan and Woodridge, 2018: 332–348; Gilligan, 2019). Therein and beyond,
the use of ﬁnancialised business models are now generalised techniques in the market
for corporate control where the relentless search for investor value ruptures
established reciprocal relations between capital and labour.
By the time of Britain’s City ‘Big Bang’ in 1986, the growing size of the ﬁnancial
sector positioned the British economy centre stage in global capitalism. New ﬁnancial
actors such as global asset management for hedge funds, private equity ﬁrms and
sovereign wealth funds now dominated the City of London. The presence of support
services for these intermediaries in the city witnessed the new Labour Government
from 1997 further remove regulatory obstacles to international capital movements
and foreign ownership of British ﬁrms (Pendleton and Gospel, 2014: 88; Clark,
2019). The now fully embedded principle of proﬁt maximisation and its distribution
to investors legitimised the central concern of those who invest in and manage capital
markets—the market for corporate control—to exert discipline on managers at ﬁrm
level to maximise shareholder value (Münnich, 2016: 285). This further embedded
the Friedman doctrine not only in business practice but also in government policy ap-
proaches to regulation, so-called light-touch regulation or deregulation and ﬂexibility
as legal and social norms (Mayer, 2019: 131).
The connection to employment relations is clear: ﬁnancial deregulation and inter-
national integration, which re-adjusted British capital into a global form, was a path-
way to the dominance of activist investor supported investor–owners and the
generalisation of the ﬁnancial techniques they ﬁrst pioneered. This movement has
contributed directly to the decline in wages as a share of national income. The wages
share has fallen from over 60 per cent in the 1970s to less than 53 per cent where it has
remained since 1982 (OECD, 2015; Haldane, 2015). The wage share includes wages
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and non-wage beneﬁts such as pensions and national insurance contributions that
represent reproduction costs for labour where part of the broadly deﬁned reduction
in the wages share ﬂows from the re-structuring of pension schemes. For advocates
of neoliberalism, reducing the labour share is essential because wages, including em-
ployer pension contributions, are not components of aggregate demand; rather, they
are costs of production. Similarly, employer pension contributions represent longer
term ﬁnancial commitments, which the state and employers seek to externalise to in-
dividuals as they re-commodify labour and social welfare (Jessop, 2015: 25).
Throughout the 2000s, activist business models encouraged those who owned and
managed listed ﬁrms to delist them or re-domicile them and themselves as individuals
to offshore territories. In many such territories, for example, Jersey, the British Virgin
Islands (where several nominee companies controlled BHS) and Monaco (where Tina
Green is domiciled), the absence of comparative transparency in decision making is
informed by investor and shareholder value and has the potential for signiﬁcant un-
derlying effects on employment relations issues (Deakins and Adams, 2018). These
strategies highlight the extent to which capital is no longer willing to make continuous
reciprocal commitments to labour or even ﬁrm ownership as a sustainable going con-
cern (Clark, 2009, 2016).
Therefore, a second connection to employment relations is that sustained restora-
tion of proﬁtability and associated appropriation of value from a business depends
on marginalising the collective interests of labour and re-commodifying labour as
abstracted precarious individual units beyond the standard employment relationship
(Cox and Nilsen, 2014: 141–147; Rubery et al., 2018). In the 1990s, this was achieved
by the application of monetary policy which allowed unemployment to ﬂuctuate to
retain price stability, by restricting organised labour legally and rationing welfare
state expenditure (Glyn, 2006: 27–31; Sikka, 2008: 963–970). In addition to this, the
privatisation of water, energy, housing, transport, telecoms infrastructure and educa-
tion provision has over the past 30 years been one means by which proﬁtability has
been pumped back into what became the private sector (Mason, 2015: 278). A third
connection to employment relations is that the legal assault on organised labour
and its re-commodiﬁcation laid the ground work for the reform of ﬁnal salary pension
schemes and the diffusion of new business models that strategise uses for employer
pension fund contributions which take money out of the ﬁrm (Grady, 2013).
These three connections to employment relations confront workers who have paid
into organisation-level or sector wide ﬁnal salary pension schemes for much of their
working life when the projected value of their ‘deferred income’ on retirement appears
under threat or less than they expected. The reduction in the value of pension incomes
may result from a re-calibration of contribution payments and membership rules
where a scheme is allegedly in deﬁcit (Universities Superannuation Scheme (USS)),
is healthy (British Coal), is healthy but is driven into deﬁcit and administration by em-
ployer decision making (MG Rover, BHS through to Carillion). So a fourth connec-
tion to employment relations centres on the deferred pay status of employee and
employer contributions to ﬁnal salary pension schemes (The Pensions Regulator,
2014). The connection to employment relations is therefore clear; pension fund mem-
bers have already earned what is now their deferred income, which they receive as
pension entitlements. This includes employer contributions that form part of workers’
deferred pay, paid by employers on behalf of labour. So the use of employer pension
contributions is an employment relations issue, but what requires further clariﬁcation
is how and in what ways government policy enabled the potential for this use?
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3.1 Financialisation—an (un)intended consequence of pension scheme (de)-regulation?
Grady (2013) outlines the cumulative effects of four pieces of legislation which com-
bine with associated policies enacted by the 1997 Labour Government that enable in-
vestor–owners to use monies provisionally allocated to employer contributions to
ﬁnal salary pension schemes to take money out of a ﬁrm. First, the Conservative
Government’s 1986 Finance Act imposed a 5 per cent cap on the value of assets over
liabilities in deﬁned beneﬁt pension schemes where any surplus greater than 5 per cent
became subject to signiﬁcant taxation liability. Second, the 1995 Pensions Act re-
quired a sponsoring employer to keep a pension scheme solvent, that is, make-up
back payments for pension contribution holidays. Here, employers could effectively
over pay their contributions to pay down their contribution arrears or pledge other
assets such as property as collateral. Third, under the Pensions Act 2004 and the
2005 ﬁnancial reporting stand 17 a parent ﬁrm balance sheet must clearly account
for and report on pension fund assets and liabilities. The 2004 Act introduced a
statutory funding objective which requires all schemes to be fully funded to 100 per
cent and where this is not the case an employer must devise a recovery plan and report
on this every three years. Pension fund trustees must encourage employers to increase
their contributions to a fund if it is in deﬁcit. That is, make-up for contribution holi-
days or at least desist from continuing holidays whilst a scheme is heavily in deﬁcit,
but the legislation fell short of making this an enforceable statutory requirement on
an employer. The 2004 Act also created The Pensions Regulator, which came into
operation in 2005 as a non-departmental public body accountable to parliament
under the auspices of the Department of Work and Pensions. Lastly, measures
enacted by the 1997 Labour Government budget abolished dividend tax credits for
pension funds. Pension funds were able to claim these credits in respect of dividends,
which they paid to ﬁrms. The logic of the Chancellor, Gordon Brown, was that
‘exempt’ investors had an incentive to persuade ﬁrms to pay dividends—extract
value—rather than invest in the business. The abolition of these credits posed few
challenges at the time of their introduction as the sustained rise in share prices that
preceded the dot.com crisis in 2000 enabled pension funds to absorb the losses.
Individually, the design of each measure aimed to increase and further assure the
security of pension scheme contributions made by workers and to transmit these into
secure pension payments. In contradistinction to this, the measures had unintended
consequences and meshed with the motives and instruments of ﬁnancialisation and
ﬁnancialised investor strategies causing many sponsoring employers to rethink
implicit contracts behind their pension contributions to worker schemes. The 5 per
cent cap encouraged ﬁrms to match pension fund assets to liabilities, a move which
guaranteed future fund deﬁcits as longevity projections suggested that scheme mem-
bers would live longer than previously thought. This potential liability encouraged
owners and investors to manage the cap which they did so by taking employer contri-
bution holidays—taking money out of a business. Employer contribution holidays led
to fund deﬁcits, a development that encouraged employers to require pension scheme
members to work longer to receive previously agreed payouts and close schemes to
new members. Simultaneously, the motives and instruments of activist investors
and investor–owners led to the ﬁnancialisation and associated securitisation of em-
ployer pension contributions and the use of pension scheme funds as collateral for
debt loading. The term dividend recapitalisations that in turn became central to
short-term investor–owner strategies disguised these developments. The use of monies
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in this way re-made some ﬁrms as mineable assets rather than sustainable going con-
cerns. The ﬁrst high-proﬁle example of this strategy was the manner in which the
‘Phoenix 4’ managed MG Rover and its subsequent collapse into administration
(Bailey et al., 2010: 375). Just after the collapse of MG Rover, a National Audit
Ofﬁce report found that in March 2005, its pension schemes had substantial shortfalls
of up to 50 per cent. Further, in the event of a collapse, this deﬁcit would require sig-
niﬁcantly lower pension payouts than scheme members anticipated on retirement.
The Phoenix 4 who had made no payments into the schemes knew this and that the
government would extend a one-week loan to the ﬁrm to enable it to continue until
the new pension protection fund became operational in April 2005. A more recent ex-
ample is the collapse of Carillion (HC, 2018). At both MG Rover and Carillion, in-
vestor–owners diverted employer pension fund contributions (i.e. declined to make
payments to the pension fund) to other uses such as dividend recapitalisations or in-
terim dividend payments to themselves. The next part of the article on BHS shows
how ﬁnancial and organisational manipulation returns these revenue streams to in-
vestors, senior management teams or associated consultants via the charges they levy
on a ﬁrm.
4 BRITISH HOME STORES UNDER GREEN AND RETAIL ACQUISITIONS:
A POUND STORE STORY OR A £363 MILLION POUND STORE STORY?
This part of the article connects the theoretical framework derived from Akerlof
and Romer, and its connection to contemporary ﬁnancialisation to a narrative
on the acquisition and then sale of BHS by the Arcadia group. In addition, micro
level insights and macro level insights provide further development of the Akerlof
and Romer framework. The former focus the effects of looting on employees,
whereas the latter focus on the manner in which looting ‘appears lawful’ because
of the frailties of the regulatory framework. To summarise, investor–owners are
able to extract value for themselves by running a business into the ground by tak-
ing advantage of the principle of limited liability and use of debt. Creative uses of
limited liability and debt underpin the potential for signiﬁcant social harm far
greater than the private beneﬁts that accrue to business owners. The narrative de-
velops this framework and shows how limited liability enables the application of
sophisticated ﬁnancialised business models and related forms of debt funding to
disguise debt levels. The social harms that potentially ﬂow from these disguises
centre on pension payment write-downs or wage theft suffered by workers because
there is a disconnection between these disguises and investor–owner actions. This is
so because the trustees of the pension protection fund actually make the decisions.
The narrative draws on primary sources from the HC (2018, 2016), the pension
regulator (2014, 2017), the National Audit Ofﬁce (2018), BHS annual reports
(2013, 2014) and Parliament live TV (2016). The narrative also draws on insights
provided by an authoritative narrative on Phillip Green and the collapse of the
high street (Shah, 2018).
4.1 British Home Stores under Phillip Green—limited liability
British Home Stores (BHS) was bought by Phillip Green for £200 million in May
2000 and immediately sold to Taveta number two investments, an offshore nominee
holding vehicle, for the same amount of money in a transaction which was 100 per
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cent leveraged over an eight-year deal. That is, Taveta that was majority owned by
members of the Green family put no money into the deal. Over the next four years
until 2004, the BHS group paid £423 million in dividends and leaseback deals for
property to Arcadia and Taveta; £307 million of this went directly to the Green family
(HC, 2016: 5). Ten years later in 2014, BHS was in a ﬁnancially precarious position
and effectively kept in business by loans from the Green family totalling £250 million.
Green made a strategic choice to appropriate considerable value from BHS in its
earlier proﬁtable years and made no attempt to increase investment in the ﬁrm to sus-
tain its competitive edge, for example, sell BHS and Topshop products on platforms
such as ASOS (as seen on screen). More speciﬁcally, Taveta number two investment
was a 100 per cent leveraged offshore investment vehicle created speciﬁcally to reduce
taxation and transparency liability, which combined with another offshore ﬁrm—
Carmen, owned by the Green family signiﬁcantly reduced taxation liabilities on its
revenues from leases on BHS properties. For balance, the Bank of England’s post
crisis policy of quantitative easing negatively affected the valuation of all ﬁnal salary
pension schemes. The policy centred on the creation of large numbers of government
bonds or gilts. The problem for pension funds is that gilt yields measure the value of a
fund, the lower the yield—signiﬁcantly affected by quantitative easing—the higher
the liabilities. A creative use of limited liability by delisting in combination with these
structural developments enabled an equally sophisticated use of debt by management
at BHS. The latter took money out of the ﬁrm funded by monies nominally allocated
to employer pension fund contributions (Shah, 2018: 150).
4.2 British Home Stores under Phillip Green—debt
Arcadia via Taveta and Carmen extracted and appropriating value from BHS by
loading the business with debt. Instruments, which facilitated this strategy included
sale and leaseback arrangements, securitisation of ﬁrm level assets and off shoring
of holding and nominee companies to reduce transparency. BHS’s holding and nom-
inee companies were under the control of trusts on behalf of individual owners, many
of whom whose domicile was in low or zero income taxation territories (Sikka, 2018:
89–93). More signiﬁcantly though, and without much scrutiny, under Green’s leader-
ship as an employer, BHS declined to make the necessary employer pension contribu-
tions to retain the sustainability of the pension fund. Instead of this, he took monies
out of the ﬁrm to load it with debt. On acquisition, the two BHS pension funds had
20,000 members and operated with a £43 million surplus. By 2009, the deﬁcit on
the two pension schemes was £166 million and as the deliberations in the Department
of Work and Pensions inquiry into the collapse of the BHS reported Green sought to
avoid these payments (HC, 2016, paragraph 25: 12). Moreover, some of the monies,
which should have gone into the pension schemes, went into dividend payments, man-
agement charges, sale and leaseback payments and associated charges, inter ﬁrm
loans and use of BHS shares as collateral for loans to fund company purchases.
The pension regulator asked for information on what charges Arcadia was levying
on BHS, but Green and his managerial colleagues declined to provide this informa-
tion (HC, 2016: 16). The pension scheme deﬁcit prevented the sale of BHS to an
appropriate and credible buyer, for example, Sports Direct declined to buy the ﬁrm
for precisely these reasons. By 2012, the BHS pension scheme deﬁcit was £233 million,
and Green began seeking a buyer for the business. The Pensions Regulator calculated
a deﬁcit recovery plan for BHS stating that it would take 12.5 years to fully fund the
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scheme if appropriate employer contributions were made, and by 2013, this had
grown to 23 years nearly three times the recovery plan length for all schemes in deﬁcit
which was eight years (HC, 2016, paragraph 26: 13).
4.3 British Home Stores under Phillip Green—the potential for social harm
Throughout 2013 and 2014, Arcadia sought to re-structure the BHS pension scheme,
but the pension regulator refused to sign-off the re-structuring plan termed project
Thor. Project Thor proposed signiﬁcantly reducing the value of pension income for
shop ﬂoor workers. This was particularly the case for any BHS pensioner whose
pension income was to be greater than £35,000. This is the cap number where
write-downs begin on transfer of a scheme to the pension protection fund. The pen-
sion regulator took the view that project Thor contained serious moral hazard impli-
cations; essentially, if the project failed and or BHS went into administration, BHS
pension liabilities would be transferred to the pension protection fund which Green
and his colleagues knew to be the case. Accordingly, they had no incentive to make
the re-structuring plan work; this was the position taken by the pensions’ regulator
(HC, 2016, paragraph 31: 14). However, by selling BHS as a going concern, Green
and his colleagues thought they had absolved themselves of any liability. The
Department of Work and Pensions identiﬁed the potential for moral hazard when
the pension protection fund was unveiled in 2004 similarly BHS pension fund trustees
did so in 2005. However, the pension regulator and the pension protection fund failed
to act decisively in this case where it was common knowledge that a ﬁnancialised
moral hazard was unfolding which Green sidestepped by selling BHS as a going
concern (HC, 2018: 10; Shah, 2018: 7, 151, 160).
4.4 Retail Acquisitions—limited liability, debt and social harm
In January 2015, Green terminated the discussion of project Thor blaming the regu-
lator for continuing problems with the BHS pension schemes and after several abor-
tive attempts, including the one with Sports Direct Retail Acquisitions bought BHS
for £1. Arcadia and Phillip Green sold the business as a going concern, which had
ﬁnancial support from the Taveta investment group, and as the 2013 and 2014 BHS
annual reports outline was allegedly capable of trading without threat of liquidation
for 12 months (BHS, 2013, 2014). To establish credibility, Retail Acquisitions had to
provide £35 million of equity to secure working capital. The leadership of Retail
Acquisitions attempted to do so by negotiating a deal with Farallon capital manage-
ment, an American investment ﬁrm. On the basis that Retail Acquisitions had both
the equity and the working capital, the sale from Arcadia to Retail Acquisitions went
ahead because the pension regulator had no power to stop the sale of BHS as a going
concern (HC, 2016: 55–56). In reality, Retail Acquisitions had neither equity nor
working capital. Chappell alleged that the £35 million was available from the sale
of the BHS headquarters building in Marylebone, central London, but this failed to
transpire (Parliament live TV 1, 2016). Rather than a ﬁrm offer of funding Farallon
Capital issued only a non-binding term-sheet offer to Retail Acquisitions setting out
the details of a possible loan that was subject to satisfactory resolution of BHS pen-
sion liabilities with the pension regulator, this too failed to transpire (Parliament live
TV 1, 2016). In fact, Chappell ignored this term in the proposed deal. In any event,
the funding deal was in fact three £40 million loans each of which was payable after
the repayment of the previous loan. The only working capital that Retail Acquisitions
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was able to secure was a £25 million loan facility from Green who via Arcadia and
Taveta investments remained BHS’s biggest creditor. Despite the failure to secure
funding, Retail Acquisitions appropriated £7 million on its ﬁrst day of ownership to
pay advisers, its board, associated salary costs and transaction management fees.
Moreover, Retail Acquisitions removed all proﬁtable assets from BHS transferring
these to its separate ownership and appropriated £11 million in fees and salary costs
in its 13-month ownership of BHS. Retail Acquisitions assumed full responsibility for
the BHS pension scheme deﬁcit but made no payments into the scheme, and by April
2015, when BHS was wound up by Her Majesty’s Revenues and Customs, the deﬁcit
stood at £571 million. The 20,000 BHS employees who were members of the schemes
and former employees who received payment from the schemes faced an uncertain
future. On transfer of the BHS pension scheme, liabilities to the pension protection
fund its trustees proposed write-downs on pension payouts of up to 31 per cent where
the average across the BHS schemes was 25 per cent (HC, 2016: 31–35).
There was a furious media reaction with the Daily Mail (‘Sir shifty’) and the
Independent (‘what’s the real story’) newspapers leading the charge of personal abuse
and viliﬁcation against Green and his business methods. The resulting Department of
Work and Pension’s inquiry was more furious still with several of its parliamentary
sessions witnessing acrimonious exchanges between its chair, Frank Field MP and
witnesses (Parliament live TV 2, 2016). More intensely, still, Green threatened to
sue Field for defamation unless he withdrew remarks made both within and beyond
parliamentary privilege. In summary branded a crook and a spiv, Green assumed
the role of a Ronald ‘Tiny’ Rowland unacceptable face of capitalism and much more.
Field demanded that Green return the monies that should have gone into employer
pension fund contributions which had been taken out of the ﬁrm and distributed to
investor–owners. Green stated that he had no responsibility for these in a personal
capacity that was the case. However, after due consideration on behalf of
BHS’s investor–owners in May 2016, Sir Phillip Green agreed to pay £363 million
to the two insolvent BHS pension funds. The proposal saw staff receive on average
80 per cent of full beneﬁts. The 9,000 scheme members with pension pots of less than
£18,000 were offered cash settlements, and the other 10,000 members receive top-ups
(to between 80 and 88 per cent of original entitlements) in a new scheme.
The acrimony between Field and Green continued in 2018 when Green’s invest-
ment vehicle Taveta sought an injunction to prevent full publication of a Financial
Reporting Council report into the collapse of BHS that also implicated Price
Waterhouse Coopers (PWC), BHS’s auditors, ﬁning them £6.5 million for the short-
comings in BHS audits under Green and Chappell (Financial Reporting Authority,
2018). Field said he would publish the report under parliamentary privilege if the
Taveta injunction succeeded, which in the end it do not (Times, 23 June 2018).
5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION THE RE-POLITICISATION OF
PENSIONS?
Recent contributions to the employment relations literature examine the impact of
state-led austerity (Heery et al., 2018), welfare retrenchment (Yates, 2017), the poten-
tial for deepening inequalities at work (Wolfson, 2018) and subsequent increases in
precarious work and precarious employment status (Vershinina et al., 2018). Pensions
and appropriation of value from pension schemes have been largely lacking from this
analysis, but as demonstrated in this article, investor–owner use of employer pension
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fund contributions to take money out of a ﬁrm and borrow against a pension scheme
represents signiﬁcant historical wage theft. This does occur in only a small minority of
cases (Department of Work and Pensions, 2018: 12; Pensions Regulator, 2017: 11,
2018: 4). However, as in the BHS example, these cases frequently reveal employers
deliberately seeking to avoid responsibility and failing to comply with the requests
from the pension’s regulator. More signiﬁcantly, at BHS, the deliberate actions of
owners knowingly failed to strike a balance between business need and the reduction
of a pension scheme deﬁcit.
The research questions posed by this study reconnect work and political economy
by further developing the Akerlof and Romer ‘privatised looting’ framework for
private gain at public expense. The study does so by examining the deliberate appro-
priation and ﬁnancialisation of employer contributions to the BHS ﬁnal salary
pension schemes by its investor–owners. In terms of the ﬁrst research question on
how BHS’s investor–owner managers were able to do this, the article makes three
contributions to new knowledge by further developing the Akerlof and Romer
(1993) framework empirically. First, on limited liability, it is the case that any type
of ﬁrm can take advantage of limited liability protections by diverting or securitising
employer pension fund contributions or entering administration. However, as this
study illustrates in some cases, managers who are also owner–investors strategise
‘taking money out of a business’ to re-distribute it to investor–owners. The recent
Department of Work and Pensions inquiry into the collapse of BHS also makes this
point. Therefore, a second contribution to new knowledge ﬂows directly on from
the collapse of BHS which demonstrates that in this case like many others, pension
fund deﬁcits and corporate debt piles are not the result of a ‘pension crisis’. Rather,
much of the debt pile and fund deﬁcits result from the demands of investor value,
its antecedence in the Friedman doctrine which has become normalised as a ﬁrm level
objective in proﬁt maximisation above all others and its contemporary manifestation
in the ﬁnacialisation of ﬁrm level assets. The pursuit of investor value and returns to
investors demonstrates our second development of Akerlof and Romer whereby debt
levels either within or beyond publicly accountable limited liability can be disguised
and ﬁnancialised by sophisticated accounting terms which under play or ignore the
debt component. A third contribution to new knowledge is the dissection of Green’s
voluntarily repayment of employer contributions to the pension scheme. The offer to
make these payments represents social harm reputational damage limitation associ-
ated with and ﬂowing from inappropriate use of pension fund contributions that
diverted monies to investors and owners, that is, blatant historical wage theft or
looting.
So turning to the second research question, this is why the permissive diversion
of employer contributions to a pension scheme and money owed to these schemes
are an employment relations issue. Historical wage theft is a signiﬁcant social
harm; its effects on those concerned are of much greater signiﬁcance to them as in-
dividual workers and society collectively than the additional private gain secured
by the Green family. So why does lawful diversion of employer pension fund con-
tributions remain an employment relations issue? Managers acting on behalf of
capital can appropriate, sell or take contribution holidays both before and after
pension schemes are re-structured—effectively going back in time to extract the
previously earned-deferred income of labour. As this study shows the diversion
of employer contributions to ﬁrm level ﬁnal salary pension schemes represents a
strategic choice for an owner to either appropriate value from a business and
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return it to investors and new owners in interim dividends and payments or invest
the money in developing the business.
A strength of the Department of Work and Pension’s report on BHS was the expo-
sure of these types of business practices and the impact of them on labour. However,
the report has substantial weaknesses. For example, it remains lawful to sell a ﬁrm as
a going concern despite the pension regulator having moral hazard concerns on any
proposed re-structure of a pension scheme by ﬁnancialised methods that take money
out of a business (HC, 2016, paragraph 44: 19). That is, at BHS, Green knew that the
pension regulator would ﬁnd what came out in the Department of Work and Pensions
inquiry and subsequently Financial Reporting Council report but sought to sell out to
Retail Acquisitions to absolve his investment vehicles of any legal responsibility.
Accordingly, in this voluntary arrangement, BHS pensioners still lose at least 12
per cent of their deferred income. That is, this deal which is better than that proposed
by the pension protection fund still costs BHS workers and former workers 12 per
cent of their (deferred) income, the spoils of which other stakeholders have been able
to appropriate.
The acquisition of BHS by Sir Phillip Green and the Taveta Investment Group
followed by its sale to Retail Acquisitions illustrates multiple frailties in the contem-
porary regulation of British capitalism and within this the now embedded pattern
of ﬁnancialisation associated with its workings. In particular, these owners used per-
missive governance in private investment vehicles that have resulted in signiﬁcant
implications for the regulation of deﬁned beneﬁt pension schemes. The looting then
collapse of BHS, particularly the money owed by its owners to the pension scheme,
is not just a case of greedy investor–owners, incompetent regulators and collusive
auditors conspiring to oversee the collapse of a major business. Instead, the BHS
story is one of fundamental defects in the incentive arrangements that drive
investor–owners to raise debt, ﬁnancialise it and borrow against pension fund contri-
butions credits in order to pay dividends, fees investor–owners and associated invest-
ment vehicles.
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